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MODERATE AND NON-ARBITRARY 
SENTENCING WITHOUT GUIDELINES: 
THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE 
TATJANA HÖRNLE* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The participants in the symposium for which this paper was written 
discussed sentencing reforms in different countries. Compared to the situation 
in other countries (such as Australia, Israel, England and Wales, and the United 
States) Germany stands out: sentencing laws have not undergone major reforms 
recently, nor are such reforms being discussed. Sentencing reform is not a 
political issue and the sentencing reform movement has not reached Germany. 
The notion that the legislature (either parliament or commissions working on 
behalf of parliament) should regulate judges’ control of sentencing is alien to 
the contemporary German discourse. There is no pressure in this direction from 
either the public or academic circles. This provides an astonishing contrast with 
developments elsewhere, and requires an explanation. What accounts for this 
passivity? Why are Germans content to leave the control of a crucial step in the 
application of the criminal law solely in the hands of the judiciary? 
Two possible explanations come to mind. It might be the case that German 
sentencing rules and practices in fact need reform, and the lack of reform 
proposals reflects a lack of critical evaluation or political inactivity in the face of 
known deficiencies. Or there is a simpler explanation: If the current system, 
without sentencing guidelines, works fairly well overall (that is, if it achieves 
both a satisfying degree of equality in sentencing and moderate, reasonable 
sentences) then this could provide a rational explanation for why reform is not 
on the political agenda. I tend towards the second explanation. Of course, it 
would be hyperbolic to claim that the situation concerning sentencing is perfect 
in Germany. In previous publications I have criticized the status quo of German 
sentencing theory from a normative perspective,1 and it is still the case that a lot 
needs to be done to improve both principles and rules. In part II of this article, 
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 1.  See TATJANA HÖRNLE, TATPROPORTIONALE STRAFZUMESSUNG (1999); Tatjana Hörnle, 
Das antiquierte Schuldverständnis der traditionellen Strafzumessungsrechtsprechung und –lehre, 54 
JURISTENZEITUNG 1080 (1999). 
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the legal provisions of the German Criminal Code are sketched out, showing 
that they do not provide sufficient guidance for sentencing. But if one moves 
beyond sentencing theory and beyond the demand for improvement within the 
national legal framework, and instead focuses on sentencing practices from a 
comparative perspective, then a somewhat more optimistic stance seems 
defensible. As I am not a criminologist, I will not present my own empirical 
research. Instead, I will give a short overview of available data in part III, data 
which supports the conclusion that sentencing in Germany appears to be fairly 
moderate and consistent. The next step will be to suggest hypotheses in order to 
explain the status quo. What could be the factors that insulate a system against 
the danger of becoming overly harsh and punitive (as can arguably be seen in 
parts of the U.S. legal system, including the U.S. federal system)2 and the 
danger of arbitrary sentencing decisions that produce a high degree of 
disparity? In part IV, circumstances of this kind will be considered. My more 
modest aim is to point out some influences that should (among others) be taken 
into account within complex models to explain why systems can achieve 
satisfactory sentencing outcomes without intensive legislative control. 
II 
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
A.  Sentencing Provisions in the German Criminal Code 
The major source for substantive criminal law in Germany is the Criminal 
Code, which was introduced in 1871. The Criminal Code and the Code of 
Criminal Procedure are federal laws, and courts within the sixteen German 
“Länder” apply these uniform federal laws.3 The Criminal Code combines 
offense descriptions with a sentence range for each offense in its Special Part, 
and in its General Part it stipulates general principles for sentencing.4 With 
respect to the kind of sanctions available, major reforms took place in the 
twentieth century. The most important changes were: the abolition of the death 
penalty (see Article 102 of the Basic Law—the German Constitution—and the 
corresponding reform of the German Criminal Code in 19535); a reform of the 
modes of imprisonment, which were originally more differentiated than today;6 
 
 2.  See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (2004); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH 
JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 
(2003).   
 3.  The German Länder do not have penal codes of their own because the Basic Law (the 
German Constitution) declares that criminal law and criminal procedure are federal matters. See Art. 
71 GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ][GG][BASIC LAW], 
May 23, 1949, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl.] I.  
 4.  Strafgesetzbuch [STGB] [Criminal Code], May 15, 1871, BGBl. I at 3322, as amended, §§ 46–
47. 
 5.  Drittes Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz [Third Law Amending Criminal Law], Aug. 4, 1953, BGBl. 
I at 735. 
 6.  The German Criminal Code of 1871 distinguished places of detention according to their social 
stigma: very dishonorable (“Zuchthaus”), simple prison (“Gefängnis”), and confinement in a fortress, a 
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the availability of suspended sentences was introduced and expanded several 
times;7 and the day-fine system was introduced in 1974.8 An earlier reform had 
introduced measures that created a so-called two-track system with criminal 
punishment on the one hand, and measures of rehabilitation and incapacitation 
on the other.9 In addition to detention in a psychiatric hospital for the mentally 
ill or treatment in an addiction treatment center, preventive detention 
constitutes another important means of incapacitation10 (which was introduced 
in 1933 with the Law Against Habitual Criminals).11 According to the model 
used in the German Criminal Code, preventive detention is clearly distinct from 
criminal punishment.12 The crucial difference is that it is an incapacitating 
measure in addition to imprisonment (not in place of), which is executed after 
the offender has served his punishment (and thus has already suffered 
punishment according to his guilt and the wrong done). 
With respect to criminal punishment, the General Part of the Criminal Code 
contains a few provisions concerning sentencing which restrict judges’ choice of 
sanctions (the statutory punishment ranges often encompass fines, shorter 
suspended prison sentences, or longer terms of imprisonment). The Code 
expresses a preference for fines rather than short-term imprisonment 
(imprisonment for a period shorter than six months), and it does not permit 
suspended imprisonment if the sentence length exceeds two years.13 But in other 
ways sentencing in Germany remains a rather traditional affair. While the types 
of sanctions available have changed considerably since the introduction of the 
 
“gentleman’s place of arrest” (“Festungshaft”). Thus the same length of imprisonment had different 
meanings. For these distinctions and the processes which led to a uniform mode of confinement, see 
WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 131. 
 7.  In 1953, suspended prison sentences were introduced, and in 1969–70 this option was 
extended. Now suspension is possible for prison terms of up to two years. See STGB § 56. 
 8.  Einführungsgesetz zum Strafgesetzbuch [EGStGB] [Introductory Act to the Criminal Code], 
Mar. 2, 1974, BGBl. I at 469.  
 9.  STGB § 61. 
 10.  STGB § 66. The legislature has amended these provisions because the German Federal 
Constitutional Court declared them unconstitutional. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal 
Constitutional Court] May 4, 2011, 128 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS 
[BVERFGE] 326. Superficial reports made it sound as if this was the end of preventive detention in 
Germany. In reality the message of the Constitutional Court was addressed primarily to those 
responsible for prison administration. The Court objected to common features in the execution of both 
imprisonment and preventive detention, and demanded that the “non-punitive” character of the latter 
be accentuated. In December 2012 the legislature clarified that offenders in preventive detention must 
be treated differently than those in “ordinary” prisons in numerous additional ways. Bundesgesetzblatt 
[BGBl] I at 2425.  
 11.  Gesetz gegen gefährliche Gewohnheitsverbrecher und über Maßregeln der Sicherung und 
Besserung [Law Against Habitual Criminals], Nov. 24, 1933, Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBl] I at 995. 
 12.  The German notion of a clear-cut separation between imprisonment as criminal punishment 
and preventive detention has been challenged by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in a 
decision which concerned the principle of retroactivity. See M. v. Germany, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1. But 
note that the ECHR objected to retroactive aggravation, not to the German institution of preventive 
detention in general. 
 13.  STGB §§ 47, 56. 
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German Criminal Code in 1871, this is less so for the principles that determine 
sentence length. 
With respect to the legal techniques that frame judges’ decisions concerning 
“how much” and “how long,” not very much has changed since the nineteenth 
century. The legislature provides for upper and lower limits in all criminal 
norms that form the Special Part of the German Criminal Code, while leaving a 
wide range of sentencing options for most offenses. Within the Continental 
European tradition, the determination of the actual sentence was and still is the 
domain of judges.14 The framework for determining sentence length in the 
original Code can still be seen in today’s version. If one looks at some typical 
offenses, the statutory sentence range is still the same or similar to the original 
range of 140 years ago. For simple theft, in 1871 the judge could choose a term 
of imprisonment as short as one day and as long as five years. Today the range 
is between a fine and up to five years of imprisonment.15 For simple robbery, the 
range has remained the same (one year to fifteen years).16 Some of the upper 
limits have been extended (for bodily injury, the limit is now five years rather 
than the original three years), and others lowered (the mandatory minimum for 
sexual abuse of children was previously one year; now it is six months).17 For 
our purposes, it is not necessary to list changes in the Criminal Code’s sentence 
ranges in more detail. My point is that the basic structure has not changed. With 
the exception of murder, for which the law prescribes life imprisonment, the 
German Criminal Code does not contain determinate sentences.18 For all other 
criminal offenses, the Criminal Code provides a rather wide range between the 
legally permissible lower and upper limits.19 
In 1969, when the General Part of the Criminal Code underwent extensive 
reforms, a provision was introduced that lists general principles for sentencing. 
Section 46 (I) states: “The guilt of the offender is the basis for sentencing. The 
effects that the sentence can be expected to have on the offender’s future life in 
society shall be taken into account.”20 The second subsection of § 46 then details 
circumstances that the sentencer should consider, such as the offender’s motives 
and the consequences of the act.21 The general demand of § 46 of the German 
 
 14.  Judicial discretion is even more extensive in French criminal law. See, e.g., SUSANNE MÜLLER, 
DIE ANWENDUNG VON STRAFZUMESSUNGSREGELN IM DEUTSCH-FRANZÖSISCHEN VERGLEICH 
(2004). 
 15.  See STGB § 242. 
 16.  See STGB § 249. 
 17.  See STGB §§ 223, 176. 
 18.  STGB § 211.  
 19.  The same is true for criminal norms that were introduced more recently and placed outside of 
the Criminal Code, such as the Narcotics Act: the sale or possession of a non-trivial quantity of drugs 
can be punished with any sentence between three-months imprisonment and fifteen years: 
Betäubungsmittelgesetz [BtMG] [Narcotics Act], Jul. 28, 1981, BGBl. I at 358, § 29a. This is a 
considerably broad range (compare, for example, a suspended sentence of one year with twelve years 
of actual imprisonment). 
 20.  STGB § 46 (I). 
 21.  The second subsection states that 
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Criminal Code is to assess offenders’ guilt while taking the effects of this 
process on their future lives into account. The demand is general, and does not 
easily lead to a conclusion that the accused offender should be sanctioned with 
a specific fine amount or term of imprisonment. The crucial step in sentencing 
is, however, to cross the gap between abstract principles and the numerical 
value that must be the final outcome. The question with a norm such as § 46 of 
the German Criminal Code is how much guidance for court practice can be 
expected from it. The answer is obvious: the text is a rather vague recipe for 
how to arrive at a specific sentencing outcome. 
B.  The Role of the Appellate Courts and the Federal Constitutional Court 
Within a legal system characterized by wide statutory ranges for punishment 
and only a vague statutory outline of sentencing principles, the case law of the 
appellate courts seems an obvious source of additional guidance. In Germany, 
the Federal Court of Justice (“Bundesgerichtshof”), which decides some 
appeals in law, might be in a position to bridge the gap between a vague 
statutory framework and the actual decision-making of trial judges, and create 
uniform standards applicable across the country. But again, searching for 
detailed guidance leads to somewhat disappointing results. The Federal Court 
of Justice is responsible for only a small proportion of cases, namely those 
serious criminal cases that were heard initially by regional courts 
(“Landgerichte”) at trial, rather than by lower local courts (“Amtsgerichte”) 
which deal with the vast majority of criminal proceedings.22 This means that the 
Federal Court of Justice cannot directly supervise sentencing for crimes that 
make up the bulk of trial judges’ day-to-day work. Due to the complicated court 
system in Germany, which divides appellate tasks between regional courts and 
the Federal Court of Justice, crimes such as simple theft, burglary, or “hit and 
run” cases after traffic accidents do not appear before a federal court. The 
appellate system, therefore, is not well equipped to enforce uniform sentencing 
across the whole of Germany with a view to specific, practically important 
offenses. All that could be expected from the Federal Court of Justice are 
 
When sentencing the court shall weigh the circumstances in favor of and against the offender; 
consideration shall in particular be given to: the motives and aims of the offender; the attitude 
shown in the offense and the degree of force of will involved in its commission; the degree of 
the violation of the offender’s duties; the modus operandi and the consequences caused by the 
offense to the extent that the offender is to blame for them; the offender’s prior history, his 
personal and financial circumstances; his conduct after the offense, particularly his efforts to 
make restitution for the harm caused as well as the offender’s efforts at reconciliation with the 
victim.  
STGB § 46 (II) (Michael Bohlander trans.). 
 22.  If the case is heard by a local court (where the majority of criminal cases begin, at the 
“Amtsgericht”), then the appellate court is the regional court (“Landgericht”). It is also possible to 
lodge an appeal in law at the next level, the higher regional court (“Oberlandesgericht”). Only if the 
crime was of a serious nature, and therefore employed the regional court as a trial court, can the appeal 
in law be addressed to the Federal Court of Justice. See JÖRG-MARTIN JEHLE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN 
GERMANY (5th ed. 2009) (providing an overview of the German court system). 
08_HORNLE_BP (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2013  5:52 PM 
194 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 76:189 
sentencing instructions that operate on a higher level of abstraction. And 
indeed, the Federal Court of Justice has provided some such outlines. 
One of the approaches to be found in the Federal Court of Justice’s rulings 
is called the “margin” or “leeway” theory (“Spielraumtheorie”)—although the 
term “theory” is too ambitious for its thin content. It stipulates that within the 
broader statutory punishment range, there is a narrower scope of punishments 
which would be equally compatible with the particular offender’s guilt, and that 
the court may apply preventive considerations (general and special prevention) 
to finalize the actual sentence within the margin-of-guilt-compatible sentences.23 
The margin theory purports to address the trial courts and their sentencing 
decisions. However, it is not very helpful for a judge at the local or regional 
court who has to deal with an individual case, who feels insecure due to the 
wide statutory range, or who would be seriously interested in learning more 
about how to arrive at a sentence. A convincing explanation is that the Federal 
Court of Justice’s talk about “margin” and “leeway” represents an approach 
that was developed in the interest of the appellate courts. An indicator of the 
true function of the margin theory is the fact that the Federal Court of Justice 
does not demand that the margin be expressed numerically in the court’s 
rationale for a particular sentence.24 If finding the margin were taken seriously 
as a decisive step in the sentencing process, trial judges would be required to 
communicate the upper and lower limits of the margin. But appellate courts 
have a strong incentive to avoid giving detailed rules for sentencing. From the 
appellate perspective, vagueness is preferable because further precision might 
result in greater numbers of appeals. Therefore, the point of the margin theory 
is to refuse a detailed survey of sentencing decisions by postulating a “margin” 
of proportionate sentences.25 It serves to reduce the number of appeals in law—
not to assist judges of the lower courts in determining sentences. 
Another general principle developed by the Federal Court of Justice might 
be of greater interest when explaining sentencing practices from a comparative 
perspective. The Federal Court of Justice has drawn a distinction that might, on 
first hearing, sound rather technical but that impacts the general level of 
sanction severity (the question of “cardinal proportionality”).26 This is the 
distinction between an “average case” (“Regelfall”) of a certain offense type 
(for example, the average residential burglary) as it frequently appears before 
the courts and a case of “medium severity” (“Durchschnittsfall”). One could 
come up with the idea that “average” and “medium” severity are the same and 
 
 23.  See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 27, 1970, 24 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN 
DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN STRAFSACHEN [BGHST] 132, 133; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] 
[Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 10, 1987, 34 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN 
STRAFSACHEN [BGHST] 345, 349; Franz Streng, Sentencing in Germany: Basic Questions and New 
Developments, 8 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 153 (2007). 
 24.  GERHARD SCHÄFER, PRAXIS DER STRAFZUMESSUNG 165 (4th ed. 2008). 
 25.  HÖRNLE, TATPROPORTIONALE STRAFZUMESSUNG, supra note 1, at 35. 
 26.  For the distinction between ordinal and cardinal proportionality, see ANDREW VON HIRSCH, 
CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 18–19 (1993).  
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develop the following thought: as the statutory sentence range for residential 
burglary, for instance, runs from six months to ten years imprisonment,27 courts 
should locate the average case (of the kind which happens most frequently, such 
as burglaries causing between €2,000 and €5,000 of harm)28 in the middle of the 
statutory range (the middle point being four-years-and-nine-months 
imprisonment). But the Federal Court of Justice rejects such reasoning. It 
argues that average cases would be sanctioned with disproportionate severity if 
the sentence were taken from the middle section of the statutory range rather 
than from its lower section.29 This is convincing: the majority of burglaries cause 
only comparatively moderate financial harm; losses of millions of euros are rare 
events. The average case in the sense of the statistical median therefore is not 
the same as a case of medium severity.30 From the perspective of criminal policy, 
the Federal Court of Justice’s insistence that the average case not be sentenced 
from the middle of the statutory range is helpful in keeping overall sentence 
severity down. 
Another factor behind German sentencing policy which is worth mentioning 
is the role of the Federal Constitutional Court (“Bundesverfassungsgericht”). In 
numerous rulings, the Court repeats that criminal punishment must be 
proportionate to the seriousness of the crime and the offender’s guilt.31 The 
Federal Constitutional Court also emphasizes that the principle of culpability 
(or the guilt principle, another common translation for “Schuldgrundsatz”) is 
rooted in the constitutional guarantee to protect human dignity,32 and therefore 
may not be abolished or restricted through changes to the Basic Law or 
European legislation.33 The focus on the constitutional principle of culpability 
and the reiteration of the proportionality requirement are not to be 
misunderstood as the Federal Constitutional Court’s willingness to supervise 
the sentencing practices of the criminal courts. Challenging the length of a 
criminal sentence by way of constitutional complaint is generally not a 
promising strategy. Even more so than the Federal Court of Justice, the Federal 
Constitutional Court cannot afford to be a last court of appeals on sentencing, 
as this would increase the already excessive number of citizens’ complaints 
relative to the court’s capacity. The impact of the Constitutional Court’s 
 
 27.  STGB § 244 (I) (3). 
 28.  These are fictional numbers. 
 29.  See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Sept. 13, 1976, 27 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN 
DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN STRAFSACHEN [BGHST] 2, 4. 
 30.  Of course only pointing to financial harm is inadequate. Other factors, such as the 
psychological harm (anxieties etc.) inflicted on residents of the dwelling, should also be taken into 
account. In my example, I focus on financial harm to simplify the argument concerning the difference 
between an average case and a case of medium severity. 
 31.  See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 26, 2008, 120 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 224, 253; BVerfG Oct. 25, 1978, 
50 BVerfGE 5, 12; BVerfG Feb. 26, 1969, 25 BVerfGE 269, 285; BVerfG Oct. 25, 1966, 20 BVerfGE 
323, 331.  
 32.  Art. 1 (1) GG, May 23, 1949, BGBl. I at 1. 
 33.  BVerfG Jun. 30, 2009, 123 BVerfGE 267, 413. 
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jurisdiction is of a more indirect nature: it emphasizes the value of 
proportionality as a cornerstone of a vision of justice, and it anchors it in the 
consciousness of jurists, judges, and lawyers. And, in one important case, the 
Constitutional Court has specified a requirement that also implies some 
restrictions on the general punishment level, restrictions that would apply as 
constitutional restrictions if parliament were to consider sharply increasing 
terms of maximum imprisonment.34 Ruling on a challenge to the 
constitutionality of life imprisonment, the Court stressed that it is a matter of 
human dignity to give every prisoner a chance to be released from prison, not as 
a matter of mercy but by way of a legal provision granting probation even for 
murderers.35 Taking a stance against “real life” sentences for murder also means 
that it would be unconstitutional to opt for very long sentences in other cases 
that would, in effect, signify that offenders would actually need to spend the rest 
of their lives in prison. 
III 
SENTENCING PRACTICE 
If the description of the legal framework is presented to someone unfamiliar 
with the practice of sentencing in Germany or with conviction statistics and 
imprisonment rates, some of its features could invite skepticism. No sentencing 
guidelines exist, the Code does not structure and regulate the sentencing 
decision effectively, and the reach of federal appellate review is limited. Should 
this not worry us? Taken together, this might invoke apprehensions of 
problematic sentencing outcomes. If judges are not guided by a tight legal 
framework, then they might base their decisions on a highly personal 
assessment of offense severity, the offenders themelves, and purported societal 
needs. The true determining factors could become judges’ characters, their 
biases, and their personal visions of criminal policy. There are American studies 
indicating that judges’ decisions are influenced by factors such as their degrees 
of self-esteem and their attitudes towards “law and order.”36 If this is the case in 
other systems, why is it not so in the German system, which lacks sentencing 
guidelines and other detailed legal prescriptions for determining sentence 
length? Unfettered judicial discretion could result in sentencing disparities 
attributable to judges’ biases against groups of offenders, as well as inflated 
sentences driven by judges’ belief in deterrence. In order to address such 
concerns, it is worthwhile to take a look at the German practice of sentencing. 
 
 34.  For the importance of this ruling, see Frieder Dünkel, Gefangenenraten im internationalen und 
nationalen Vergleich, 8 NEUE KRIMINALPOLITIK 4, 10 (2010). 
 35.  See BVerfG Jun. 21, 1977, 45 BVerfGE 187, 227, 242–245.  
 36.  See, e.g., James L. Gibson, Personality and Elite Political Behavior: The Influence of Self 
Esteem on Judicial Decision Making, 43 J. POL. 104 (1981); John Hagan, Law, Order and Sentencing: A 
Study of Attitude in Action, 38 SOCIOMETRY 374 (1975). 
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A.  Indications of Punitiveness? 
There is some debate whether our national sentencing practice shows signs 
of increasing punitiveness, which parallels the discussion about a “new 
punitiveness” in other countries, such as the United States and England.37 If 
contrasted with imprisonment rates in other countries (see Table 1), however, 
the German situation does not indicate particularly high levels of sentence 
severity. Rather, they reveal relatively modest sentencing practices. 
 
Table 1: Prison population rate (OECD Factbook 2010: Economic, Environmental and 
Social Statistics). 
 
Prison Population Rate for the Year 2009
United 
States 
Israel United 
Kingdom 
Australia Netherlands France Germany Switzerland Sweden
760 325 153 129 100 96 90 76 74 
 
Nevertheless, authors who see a “new punitiveness” in Germany38 point to a 
development in the last two decades: the imprisonment rate (number of 
prisoners per 100,000 persons) in Germany rose from seventy-one in 1992 to 
ninety-eight in 2001 (but fell to ninety in the year 2009). Some suggest that the 
developments in Germany are part of a broader pessimistic story, the story of 
increasing punitiveness.39 However, these narratives are not always based on a 
careful reading of data or on a willingness to seriously explore the complex set 
of factors behind shifts in imprisonment rates.40 The notion of “punitiveness” is 
fuzzy; this appears in more detailed empirical studies.41 With regard to some 
 
 37.  For critical studies concerning the situation in the United States and also in England, see 
NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND PUNISHMENT IN 
CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES (2008); Tim Newburn, “Tough on Crime”: Penal Policy in England 
and Wales, in CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 425 (Michael 
Tonry ed., 2007); TONRY, supra note 2; WHITMAN, supra note 2; Joachim Savelsberg, Knowledge, 
Domination and Criminal Punishment, 99 AM. J. SOC. 911, 930 (1994). 
 38.  See Fritz Sack, Der weltweite “Punitive Turn”: Ist die Bundesrepublik dagegen gefeit?, in WEGE 
DER SICHERHEITSGESELLSCHAFT 165 (Axel Groenemeyer ed., 2010); Rüdiger Lautmann et al., 
Beiheft “Punitivität,” 8 KRIMINOLOGISCHES J. 51 (2004). For a somewhat more differentiated 
approach, see Axel Groenemeyer, Punitivität im Kontext, in GRENZENLOSE KONSTRUKTIVITÄT 209 
(Birgit Menzel & Kerstin Ratzke eds., 2003).  
 39.  See TOBIAS SINGELNSTEIN & PEER STOLLE, DIE SICHERHEITSGESELLSCHAFT: SOZIALE 
KONTROLLE IM 21. JAHRHUNDERT 90 (3d ed. 2012).  
 40.  For a critique of grossly exaggerated pictures, see Dietrich Oberwittler & Sven Höfer, Crime 
and Justice in Germany. An Analysis of Recent Trends and Research, 2 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 465, 494 
(2005). 
 41.  See Frieder Dünkel, Werden Strafen immer härter?, in GEWALTDELINQUENZ, LANGE 
FREIHEITSENTZIEHUNG, DELINQUENZVERLÄUFE 209, 233 (Britta Bannenberg & Jörg-Martin Jehle 
eds., 2011); Frieder Dünkel & Christine Morgenstern, Länderbericht Deutschland, in KRIMINALITÄT, 
KRIMINALPOLITIK, STRAFRECHTLICHE SANKTIONSPRAXIS UND GEFANGENENRATEN IM 
EUROPÄISCHEN VERGLEICH 97 (Frieder Dünkel et al. eds., 2010); Helmut Kury & Joachim Obergfell-
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offenses (such as property offenses and robberies), the German sentencing 
practice shows increasing mildness; whereas violent crimes against persons and 
sexual crimes are evaluated as relatively more serious wrongdoing.42 
Conclusions about more punitive sentencing could only plausibly be made for a 
comparatively small subcategory of crimes, and it remains to be examined 
whether shifts in the assessments of harm which lead to greater emphasis on 
physical and sexual integrity deserve the stigma typically connected with the 
label “punitiveness.” 
There are other indicators against a general “increased punitiveness” 
hypothesis. First, the statutory maximum for all crime types has not been 
increased recently in Germany (as happened, for instance, in France in 1980 
and again in 1994).43 The statutory maximum in the German Criminal Code has 
remained (from a comparative perspective) remarkably low. The upper limit for 
all offense types is set at fifteen years, except for murder and a few other 
felonies involving the death of another. Currently, there are just over one 
hundred life sentences per year.44 It does not matter what kind of felony or how 
many felonies the offender has committed: be it numerous aggravated 
robberies, awful kidnappings, a series of most humiliating rapes, or acts of 
particularly harmful arson, the maximum sentence is fifteen years 
imprisonment.45 
Another argument can be drawn from the overall distribution of sanctions 
(Tables 2A and 2B). This distribution does not support the conclusion that 
sentencing practices in Germany are harsh overall. The vast majority of criminal 
offenses committed by adult offenders are sanctioned with a fine, and the 
proportion of unsuspended prison sentences is very small. Among prison 
sentences, longer sentences of more than five years are chosen infrequently. 
 
  
 
Fuchs, Punitivität in Deutschland. Zur Diskussion um eine neue “Straflust,” in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HANS-
DIETER SCHWIND ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 1021 (Thomas Feltes et al. eds., 2006); Helmut Kury, Martin 
Brandenstein & Joachim Obergfell-Fuchs, Dimensions of Punitiveness in Germany, 15 EUROPEAN J. 
CRIM. POL’Y & RES. 63 (2009).  
 42.  Dünkel & Morgenstern, supra note 41, at 132–136. 
 43.  Sebastian Roché, Criminal Justice Policy in France: Illusions of Severity, in CRIME, 
PUNISHMENT, AND POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 471, 497 (Michael Tonry ed., 2007). 
 44. See infra Table 2B. The mean length of actual prison time for a life sentence is 18 years. See 
Axel Dessecker, Life Sentences in Germany: An Example of Increasing Punitiveness in the Criminal 
Justice System?, in PUNITIVITY. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 21, 36–38 (Helmut Kury & Evelyn 
Shea eds., 2011). 
 45.  STGB § 38 (II), § 54 (II). 
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Table 2A: Distribution of sanctions, without the minor misbehavior called 
“Ordnungswidrigkeiten” and without sentences for juveniles, from cases concluded in 
German courts in 2010 (German Federal Office of Statistics, Statistisches Bundesamt, 
Fachserie 10, Reihe 3). 
 
Adults convicted Fine Imprisonment, 
suspended
Imprisonment 
704,802 (100%) 575, 068 (81.6%) 92,073 (13.1%) 37,661  (5.3%) 
 
Table 2B: Length of prison sentences from cases concluded in German courts in 2010 
(German Federal Office of Statistics, Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 10, Reihe 3). 
 
Up to 1 year 1 to 2 years 2 to 5 
years
5 to 10 
years
10 to 15 
years 
Life 
97,396  
(75,781 suspended) 
22,052 
(16,292 suspended)
8,526 1,475 132 137 
 
Also, the distribution of sentences for particular offenses within the given 
statutory punishment range shows a regular feature: there is no equal 
distribution of sentences across the whole area of the statutory range. This is a 
well-reported phenomenon in the German literature: trial judges prefer the 
lower third of the statutory range, and the vast majority of sentences cluster in 
this area.46 Thus, the notion expressed by the Federal Court of Justice 
concerning appropriate sanctions in average cases (not in the middle of the 
range but in its lower parts) is obviously shared by trial judges.47 This is true 
even for offense types that tend to stir strong emotions against offenders. 
Examples are sexual abuse of children and offenses relating to child 
pornography, such as distribution and possession (see Tables 3A and 3B). The 
statutory punishment range for sexual abuse of children begins with six-months 
imprisonment and ends with ten-years imprisonment. As the table 3A shows, 
however, sentences of more than two years are rare, and sentences cluster in the 
lower segment of the statutory range.48 
 
  
 
 46.  HANS-JÖRG ALBRECHT, STRAFZUMESSUNG BEI SCHWERER KRIMINALITÄT 227 (1994); 
BERT GÖTTING, GESETZLICHE STRAFRAHMEN UND STRAFZUMESSUNGSPRAXIS 221 (1997); 
TILMANN SCHOTT, GESETZLICHE STRAFRAHMEN UND IHRE TATRICHTERLICHE HANDHABUNG 236 
(2004). 
 47.  See supra Part II.B. 
 48.  Note that there is a separate offense titled “aggravated sexual abuse of children” covered by 
STGB § 176a. But even for aggravated sexual abuse, the upper statutory punishment range (ten- to 
fifteen-years imprisonment) is rarely used. In 2010 there were four such sentences in the upper range, 
out of 605 total sentences. Even the five- to ten-years range does not play much of a role. In 2010, 99 
out of 605 sentences fell within this range. See German Federal Office of Statistics, Statistisches 
Bundesamt, Fachserie 10, Reihe 3. 
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Table 3A: Sentences for those convicted of sexual abuse of children (§ 176 I, II, III Criminal 
Code) in 2010 (German Federal Office of Statistics, Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 10, 
Reihe 3). 
 
All 
convictions 
Imprisonment up to 
1 year 
1 year to 2 years 2 to 5 years 5 to 10 years
850 379  
(373 suspended) 
314 
(294 suspended) 
99 17 
 
Neither in sexual abuse cases nor in child pornography cases does the 
sentence distribution show an unusual degree of punitiveness (punitiveness 
could be deduced from a more pronounced preference for sentences within the 
upper statutory sentence range). The sentence ranges for offenses in § 184b of 
the Criminal Code, relating to the prohibition of child pornography, 
differentiate between distribution (three-months to five-years imprisonment), 
commercial distribution (six months to ten years), and mere possession (fine or 
imprisonment up to two years). Unfortunately the sentencing statistics lump 
these different modes of committing the offense together. Still, the picture is 
one of relative mildness. Although this offense elicits strong emotions against 
offenders, actual time in prison for this offense is rare, and judges tend to prefer 
fines or low probation sentences. 
 
Table 3B: Sentences for distribution and possession of child pornography (§ 184b Criminal 
Code) in 2010 (German Federal Office of Statistics, Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 10, 
Reihe 3). 
 
All 
convictions 
Fine Imprisonment up to 
1 year 
1 year to 2 years 2 to 5 
years 
5 to 10 
years 
1998 1094 763 
(741 suspended) 
127 
(113 suspended) 
14 0 
 
B.  Unequal or Even Arbitrary Sentencing? 
The foregoing suggests that the lack of sentencing guidelines in the German 
criminal justice system does not seem to result in particularly severe sentences. 
The rough overview indicates that the system works fairly well (at least from 
the perspective of liberal criminal policy) in terms of overall sentence severity 
levels. However, it needs to be mentioned that data from the sentencing 
statistics are aggregate data published by the Federal Office of Statistics. Some, 
albeit limited, conclusions may be drawn by looking at sentencing patterns over 
time, again using the national statistics. It is quite surprising to see how the 
distribution of sentences for a given offense resembles the pattern of the 
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preceding year.49 Observers have characterized German criminal policy as 
embodying “stability and a certain inertia,”50 as well as “remarkable 
consistency,”51 which can also be observed in the national sentencing statistics. 
If German judges were given to highly idiosyncratic, wildly different choices of 
sentences, this would probably be evidenced by erratic patterns and greater 
fluctuation, even in the aggregate data. 
But still, the numbers in the German sentencing statistics do not exclude the 
possibility of some degree of inequality. Such inequality might be based on the 
impact of extralegal factors, that is, rule-like heuristics that should not be 
applied by a sentencing judge because they are not part of the normative 
program, such as the offender’s immigration background or socio-economic 
status. There is not much systematic empirical analysis—research on German 
sentencing practices beyond the national statistics is sparse.52 The few existing 
studies did not detect systematic biases of this kind.53 This is not conclusive 
evidence, however, that extralegal factors are as irrelevant as they should be—
they might influence some judges more than others or only affect sentencing for 
particular offenses. However, according to the state of knowledge as it is, it 
would be speculative to argue that the lack of sentencing guidelines leads to 
manifest disparities. 
Even if biases due to personal characteristics of offenders (and judges) 
cannot be uncovered, the question remains to what degree sentencing is shaped 
by factual, non-normative influences. One such factor is regional court cultures. 
There are strong hints that regional differences do exist, both at the state level 
(“Länder”) within the German federal system, and at the level of court districts 
in closer geographic proximity.54 This is hardly surprising if one is aware of how 
information about the “appropriate sentence” is spread. Entirely uniform 
practices across a country as large as Germany would be unlikely in view of the 
lack of guidelines. Transfer of knowledge about sentencing happens mostly on a 
regional level, by way of oral transmission: young judges knock at their older 
colleagues’ doors and ask them what is typical. Attorneys who are aware of 
regional customs concerning standardized crimes (such as possession of a 
certain amount of drugs for personal use) are likely to appeal if a local judge 
deviates from what is common in this region. The judges at the regional court 
who decide such appeals tend to have a better overview than an inexperienced 
 
 49.  See BERND-DIETER MEIER, STRAFRECHTLICHE SANKTIONEN 228 (2009). 
 50.  Oberwittler & Höfer, supra note 40, at 466.  
 51.  Dünkel, supra note 41, at 218. 
 52.  Oberwittler & Höfer, supra note 40, at 494. 
 53.  See ALBRECHT, supra note 46, at 199; MEIER, supra note 49, at 228; Sven Höfer, Zur 
Kongruenz von Recht und Praxis der Strafzumessung, 88 MONATSSCHRIFT FÜR KRIMINOLOGIE 127, 
132 (2005). 
 54.  MARGIT OSWALD, PSYCHOLOGIE DES RICHTERLICHEN STRAFENS 174 (1994); SCHOTT, 
supra note 46, at 224; STEFAN SUHLING & TILMANN SCHOTT, DER ANSTIEG DER 
GEFANGENENZAHLEN IN DEUTSCHLAND. FOLGE DER KRIMINALITÄTSENTWICKLUNG ODER 
WACHSENDER STRAFHÄRTE 26 (2001); Höfer, supra note 53, at 133. 
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newcomer at a local court. But having pointed out the likelihood of regional 
differences and the studies that show their existence, it is also important to 
mention that this phenomenon should not be exaggerated. It does not mean 
that, for instance, court A sanctions robberies with five-years imprisonment on 
average and court B only with two-years imprisonment. The differences are not 
that pronounced but amount to, for instance, a slightly greater percentage of 
suspended sentences for robbery and aggravated theft.55 It would thus be 
incorrect to claim that there is highly disparate or even arbitrary sentencing as a 
consequence of the vague legal framework. 
IV 
EXPLANATIONS 
A.  The Puzzle 
The foregoing sections leave us with something of a puzzle. On the one 
hand, German law does not provide much guidance for sentencing decisions. 
On the other hand, the system as a whole seems to work fairly well in the sense 
that its observers have detected neither arbitrary, highly personalized judicial 
decision-making, nor particularly punitive sentences. The concern that judges 
might not cope with sentencing satisfactorily does not occupy space in German 
discussions. This seems surprising in comparison to the discussion of recent 
developments with regard to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions at the beginning of this century declaring that the U.S. Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines are not mandatory have prompted a debate about 
increased sentencing disparity.56 It appears that at least some judges have 
returned to more personalized sentencing, which is seen as a problem that 
deserves attention.57 There is no comparable degree of scholarly or public focus 
on the possibility of sentence disparity in Germany. 
One possible explanation could be that the German lack of anxiety about 
this point can simply be traced back to the scarcity of in-depth research. After 
all, the more the issue is scrutinized, the more likely it becomes that differences 
in the sentencing patterns of judges will be uncovered. This basic logic applies 
to any subject: as long as empirical research is somewhat superficial, it is easier 
to assume that everything is just fine the way it is. However, this does not seem 
to be the most convincing explanation. It would not be fair to trace the lack of 
concern about sentencing practices in Germany solely to a lack of empirical 
knowledge. The data that is available and the assessments of criminologists who 
work with it are too uncontroversial to be written off as irrelevant. I will thus 
proceed with the assumption that it is an adequate description (rather than an 
 
 55.  SCHOTT, supra note 46, at 225. 
 56.  Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity after Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. L. REV. 
1, 13–14 (2010). 
 57.  Id. at 30. 
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expression of sheer ignorance) to say that sentencing practice in Germany 
works fairly well. But why is this so? 
B.  Political, Economic, and Cultural Factors Behind Sentencing Patterns 
In the field of comparative studies, several authors offer answers to the 
question of what may have created and perpetuated differences between the 
German way of dealing with deviant behavior and the Anglo-American 
approach, or differences between a greater number of legal systems. Such 
explanations are typically rooted in political theory and socio-economic 
reflections, or are derived from historical and cultural observations. James 
Whitman, in his book Harsh Justice,58 emphasizes degradation through 
punishment as one key factor. Along this line of thought, dominant features of 
the U.S. criminal justice system include its emphasis on degrading practices and 
a pronounced lack of respect for criminal offenders; whereas the German and 
French systems show greater willingness to treat everybody, including criminals, 
with respect.59 Whitman traces his description of the status quo back to 
historical developments. Punishment practices were traditionally closely related 
to social status, and in Continental Europe differences between “high status” 
punishments and “low status” punishments were still pronounced in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.60 Since then, however, Whitman 
claims that a process of “leveling up” has taken place, which made “high status” 
treatment the norm.61 Whitman argues that this did not happen in the United 
States because distinguished “high status” punishment did not exist in the 
nineteenth century.62 Whitman’s theory has strong explanatory power with 
respect to modes of sanctions (for example, the idea of introducing “shaming 
sanctions” is met in Germany with abhorrence), life in prison, and prison law. 
But it also applies to sentence length: respectful treatment entails keeping 
physical exclusion (imprisonment) and deprivation of property (monetary 
sanctions) moderate. Joachim Savelsberg connects criminal justice practices to 
the conditions that shape public opinions, as well as to the impact of public 
opinion on the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, and the academic 
sector.63 
Some newer publications put greater emphasis on economic arrangements 
and basic structures of political organizations. Tapio Lappi-Seppälä, writing 
about penal policy in the Scandinavian countries, explains the particularly low 
imprisonment rates and the still (despite some minor changes) impressive 
leniency of these Northern parts of Europe. He connects the “Scandinavian 
model” to general observations about the role of the state, the relationship 
 
 58.  WHITMAN, supra note 2. 
 59.  Id. at 41. 
 60.  Id. at 97. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. at 151. 
 63.  Savelsberg, supra note 37. 
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between state and citizens, and political and social culture in general.64 He 
focuses particularly on the consensual and corporatist political culture, the 
strong welfare state, and high levels of social trust as important factors.65 
Similarly, in their book Penal Systems: A Comparative Approach, Michael 
Cavadino and James Dignan relate the features of national criminal justice 
systems to societies’ basic political and economic structures (which they sort 
into the categories of neoliberalism, conservative corporatism, social democratic 
corporatism, and oriental corporatism).66 Nicola Lacey also emphasizes the role 
of socio-economic factors, and she adds insight into how electoral arrangements 
influence party politics as well as the emphasis on “law and order” within these 
processes.67 A somewhat simpler economic approach argues that richer 
countries are less inhibited about expanding prison capacities because they can 
afford to do so.68 
Macro-level studies that aim to explain broad and diffuse concepts such as 
“punitiveness” invite a critical view of methodological issues like questions of 
operationalization and validity.69 Awareness of typical problems afflicting 
macro-level research, such as definitions and the plausibility of causal 
relationships, does not, of course, challenge the basic notion that the broad 
picture matters if the task is to explain sentencing patterns. To deny that legal 
systems have to be seen against the complex backdrop of a given society or 
nation (including its cultural and historical roots, as well as its contemporary 
economic and political structures) would hardly be convincing. Nevertheless, 
one can probably gain more insight by taking a narrower focus. This means 
preference for “mid-level” descriptions which focus on specific features of legal 
cultures, institutions, and practices.70 A multitude of such descriptions might 
yield more promising results in comparative criminal justice than attempts to 
“get at the big picture at once” in macro-level research. In the following 
sections, features of the German legal system that might explain sentencing 
patterns will be discussed: the impact of preventive detention on sentencing 
practices, the recruitment and self-concept of judges, and the impact of legal 
education. 
 
 64.  Tapio Lappi-Seppälä, Penal Policy in Scandinavia, in CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND POLITICS IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 217 (Michael Tonry ed., 2007). 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  MICHAEL CAVADINO & JAMES DIGNAN, PENAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 
(2006).  
 67.  See LACEY, supra note 37 (discussing the impact of electoral arrangements). 
 68.  John van Kesteren, Public Attitudes and Sentencing Policies Across the World, 15 EUROPEAN 
J. CRIM. POL’Y RES. 25, 43–45 (2009). 
 69.  See DAVID NELKEN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 61–70 (2010). 
 70.  For the notion of “legal culture,” see David Nelken, Comparing Legal Cultures, in THE 
BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 113 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004). 
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C.  Harsh Incapacitation in Exceptional Cases 
In part I, preventive detention as an element of the German criminal justice 
system was mentioned. The issue of preventive detention ought to be taken up 
again because the mere existence of this means of incapacitation (which, 
according to the German Criminal Code, is not criminal punishment) might be 
one of several factors behind the general finding of not-particularly-harsh 
sentences. With regard to quantitative importance, preventive detention does 
not play a major role. In the German discussion about punitiveness, however, 
the issue of preventive detention appears often,71 because several legislative 
reforms extended the scope for preventive detention during the last decade72 
and because the number of convictions has risen visibly.73 But the numbers are 
still very small if compared to the number of total convictions (see Table 2A 
above).74 
And my point here is this: To discuss preventive detention only under the 
heading of “increased punitiveness” misses something. The existence of this 
institution might have an indirect impact on judges’ sentencing decisions in the 
“ordinary” cases of criminal punishment. But this impact actually works to 
moderate “punitiveness.” Preventive detention exists to address the problem of 
particularly dangerous offenders: the small group of persons who are prone to 
committing serious sexual and violent crimes.75 The German two-track system 
separates the small category of “hard-line incapacitation” from the much larger 
category of “proportionate criminal punishment.” Of course, this does not 
mean that all offenders are divided neatly into two categories with “dangerous” 
offenders being sentenced to preventive detention and “non-dangerous” 
offenders receiving proportionate punishment. If this were the case, then the 
number of sentences resulting in preventive detention could be expected to be 
much higher than approximately one hundred per year. However, the scope of 
 
 71.  See, e.g., Kury et al., supra note 41, at 71; Dünkel, supra note 41, at 214. 
 72.  See Jörg Kinzig, Die Neuordnung des Rechts der Sicherungsverwahrung, 64 NEUE 
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 177 (2011). 
 73.  Only 31 offenders were sentenced to preventive detention in 1990, 56 in 2002, 66 in 2003, and 
101 in 2010. See STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT [FEDERAL OFFICE OF STATISTICS], ABGEURTEILTE 
UND VERURTEILTE NACH DEMOGRAPHISCHEN MERKMALEN SOWIE ART DER STRAFTAT, 
ANGEWANDTEM STRAFRECHT UND ART DER ENTSCHEIDUNG. [THOSE JUDGED AND SENTENCED BY 
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS, TYPE OF CRIME, PROCEDURE USED, AND TYPE OF DECISION] 
(2010), available at https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen. 
 74.  504 persons were kept in preventive detention in March 2011 compared to 53,464 adults and 
6,099 juveniles imprisoned for criminal punishment. If the current rate of about 100 preventive 
detention sentences per year is continued, then the overall number of persons in preventive detention 
will rise quickly to over 1,000. Still, it would be false to suggest that preventive detention is nearly as 
relevant as criminal punishment. STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT [FEDERAL OFFICE OF STATISTICS], 
STRAFVOLLZUG: DEMOGRAPHISCHE UND KRIMINOLOGISCHE MERKMALE DER STRAFGEFANGENEN 
[DEMOGRAPHIC AND CRIMINOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PRISONERS], (2010), available at 
https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen.  
 75.  The governing provision requires (in addition to prior offenses and other factors) that “a 
comprehensive evaluation of the convicted person and his offenses reveals that, due to his propensity to 
commit serious offenses, particularly of a kind resulting in serious emotional trauma or physical injury 
to the victim, he poses a danger to the general public.” STGB § 66 (I) (4). 
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applicability for preventive detention covers only extreme circumstances, not an 
unspecified notion of “dangerousness.”76 It would be misleading to assume that 
preventive detention is an instrument intended to address recidivism in general. 
Rather, my argument points to a possible psychological phenomenon: the mere 
availability of preventive detention as a last resort (even if seldomly used in 
practice) might promote a more relaxed attitude in general, and thus moderate 
sentencing overall. 
D.  Recruitment and the Self-Concept of the Judiciary 
1.  A Key Factor: The Judiciary 
Some answers to the question of why German judges tend to issue sentences 
in a fairly moderate, consistent, and equal fashion might also be found by 
examining the way the judiciary is trained, appointed, and organized. Legal 
cultures and institutional contexts can influence sentencing outcomes. This is 
not a new observation. Several writers who focus on comparing the U.S. system 
with European criminal justice systems mention the relevance of the career 
judge or judges-as-civil-servants model for moderate sentencing (in Germany, 
as in other Continental European countries, judges are not elected).77 The 
following section is based on several assumptions: the way judges arrive at 
decisions, including sentencing decisions, is influenced by the way the 
profession operates; career paths and modes of recruitment matter; and the 
degree of professionalization is important. 
This is not to say that one could explain differences between countries 
simply by pointing to differences in the organization of their judiciaries. If one 
were to compare overall sentence severity in European countries, differences 
would most certainly appear even when basic features of the judiciary are 
identical (for example, no elections and similar modes of training). The 
following short descriptions of the German judiciary neither imply that these 
features are unique (it would require a lengthy study to paint a full comparative 
picture, even for continental Europe), nor that they are always the key elements 
to explain differences in sentencing. The assumption that one could identify one 
or a few key factors that explain differences or similarities in sentencing 
outcomes between nations would be out of touch with reality. My aim is more 
limited: to draw attention to circumstances that might promote relatively 
moderate, non-disparate sentencing in the absence of guidelines. This does not 
mean that similar institutional contexts will lead to comparable sentencing 
 
 76.  See STGB § 66. 
 77.  Savelsberg, supra note 37, at 931–932; TONRY, supra note 2, at 206–210; Lacey, supra note 37, 
at 73–74; Frieder Dünkel & Christine Morgenstern, Einleitung, in 2 KRIMINALITÄT, 
KRIMINALPOLITIK, STRAFRECHTLICHE SANKTIONSPRAXIS UND GEFANGENENZAHLEN IM 
EUROPÄISCHEN VERGLEICH 16 (Frieder Dünkel et al. eds., 2010); Tapio Lappi-Seppälä, Vertrauen, 
Wohlfahrt und politikwissenschaftliche Aspekte—Vergleichende Perspektiven zur Punitivität, in 
KRIMINALITÄT, KRIMINALPOLITIK, STRAFRECHTLICHE SANKTIONSPRAXIS UND 
GEFANGENENZAHLEN IM EUROPÄISCHEN VERGLEICH 937, 982–983 (Frieder Dünkel et al. eds., 2010). 
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outcomes; other factors might nevertheless overshadow these. 
2.  Recruitment 
Sentencing can be influenced by judges’ dependence on political parties, 
political movements, and public opinion. Within systems that choose judges by 
public election, it is plausible to assume that public expectations (not 
necessarily on a national level, but rather the expectations of the local 
constituency) will influence not only the way judges present themselves in the 
election, but also how they decide cases once in office. The greatest dependence 
can be expected in systems that subject judges to re-election campaigns after a 
certain period of time (retention elections). In theory, the effects of public 
opinion could go either way. It might result in severe sentences for all or for 
some offenders; but it could also lead to low levels of punishment. However, it 
seems more realistic to expect the former. 
Election of judges is not the only way to influence the judiciary’s decision-
making. Sentencing policies could also be influenced when appointments 
depend on the candidates’ political affiliations, or other factors that increase the 
likelihood of biased sentencing. Politically motivated appointments of judges 
could be as distorting for moderate, equal sentencing as politically charged 
elections.78 It is thus important to consider how far a legal system is isolated 
from such dangers. In Germany, the states’ ministries of justice appoint judges. 
Initially, this might invite skepticism about the potential for political clientelism 
because the ministers of justice are in office due to their political affiliations. 
However, the appointment procedure for judges appears to work in a neutral, 
meritocratic fashion. Eligibility to become a judge is based on merit, that is, on 
the grades candidates have achieved in the two state exams that everyone must 
pass to become a lawyer, prosecutor, or judge. A grading system with a broad 
scale (from zero to eighteen points) allows for assigning individual ranks to 
each of the several hundred candidates who take an exam. Due to a widespread 
distribution of grades that thins out towards the top, it is possible to identify the 
best candidates with relative precision. This is not to say that the German state 
exams provide an entirely reliable picture of each candidate’s capability as a 
jurist or as a judge. Talented persons can underperform, and the skills tested are 
not comprehensive enough to warrant the conclusion that those with the highest 
grades will automatically make the best judges. But the crucial point is not the 
exams’ reliability as a measure of talent, but rather their usefulness for 
politically neutral, meritocratic appointment procedures. 
3.  The Impact of a “Judges As Civil Servants” Model 
The German judiciary is characterized by fairly strong internal cohesion and 
conservative inertia, in the sense of faithfulness to established principles and 
 
 78.  For the situation in the United States, see Herbert Jacob, Courts and Politics, in COURTS, 
LAW, AND POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 16, 19 (Herbert Jacob et. al. eds., 1996). For the 
situation in England, see NELKEN, supra note 69, at 43. 
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values that are identified as part of its professional self-understanding.79 There 
are some caveats to be made with respect to this statement. First, 
generalizations about a multitude of judges in a large country have to be treated 
with some caution: a sociologist’s focus allows for different sub-types.80 Second, 
one could object that “internal cohesion” and “conservative inertia” could be 
used to describe the judiciary everywhere in the world. Arguably many judges 
in many countries are aware of their separate status as a “third power,” along 
with a high social standing, leading them to strongly identify themselves with 
their professional backgrounds. I assume, however, that despite common 
features which one could probably extract from a comparative study (strong 
internal cohesion and conservative inertia are certainly not unique to 
Germany), there are also differences. One could contrast as ideal-types (which 
real legal systems only approximate) a judges-as-individuals model (judges who 
feel entitled to express their own personality and obliged to listen to their 
personal conscience) on the one hand, with a judges-as-civil-servants model on 
the other (judges who act in a corporatist way). The stronger the corporatist 
spirit is, the more it discourages individual expressions of one’s personal and 
political preferences in sentencing decisions. For example, in Germany, judges 
typically enter their office in their late twenties or early thirties following the 
second state exam, and stay within the judiciary for decades until retirement. 
An early start to a judicial career can promote a tendency to identify oneself in 
a particularly strong way with the expectations connected with the role of a 
judge.81 
Obviously, this should not be read as simple praise of the German system 
(an attitude which would be a poor starting pointing for any exercise in 
comparative criminal justice).82 First, the path taken by a civil-servant based, 
corporatist judiciary prone to inertia is subject to various contingencies. Second, 
inertia does not imply complete immunity from shifts in the “Zeitgeist” in the 
long run. Important influences cannot be described as a matter of organization. 
If the “corporate spirit” happened to have been shaped by benevolent 
influences, the judiciary will keep these alive for a longer period even after the 
public mood has changed and public opinion and the more-political executive 
branch pursue other trends. However, the same phenomena can occur with less 
than benevolent influences. If we look back seventy years, praise for a German 
corporatist judiciary obviously would not be appropriate. At that point in time, 
if a choice had been possible between the judges-as-individuals model (judges 
who listen to their personal conscience) and the judges-as-civil-servants model, 
the evident choice would have been the former. Seen against this background, it 
 
 79.  Dünkel, supra note 41, at 233.  
 80.  See THORSTEN BERNDT, RICHTERBILDER: DIMENSIONEN RICHTERLICHER 
SELBSTTYPISIERUNGEN (2010). 
 81.  Id. at 283. 
 82.  See Chrisje Brants, Comparing Criminal Process as Part of Legal Culture, in COMPARATIVE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND GLOBALIZATION 49, 51 (David Nelken ed., 2011).  
08_HORNLE_BP (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2013  5:52 PM 
No. 1 2013] THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE 209 
is paradoxical for a German author to emphasize the benefits of a corporate 
judiciary. However, within the contemporary context, the corporatist model 
seems to have worked in Germany with benevolent effects. Influences that 
shaped the majority of high school and law students in the 1970s and 1980s still 
linger within the system. These liberal attitudes can be best described by what 
they are against: “law and order,” retribution, and harsh punishment. The 
judiciary did not create these attitudes. It is just better at preserving them within 
the context of a corporatist environment. 
E.  The Role of Legal Education in Law Schools 
Although the cultural, historical, political, and economic factors underlying 
sentencing patterns are widely discussed, and the institutional context has been 
mentioned, there is less discussion about the contribution of legal education. 
One would assume that the socialization of future judges in law school might 
have something to do with the way they work later. My remarks at this point are 
tentative. But my impression is that German judges are not shaped exclusively 
by the “Zeitgeist,” but also by a strong, deep-rooted commitment to the value 
of proportionality and justice and an equally strong skepticism of deterrence 
through harsh sentences. The question of whether a sentence is proportionate 
to the particular wrong is taken seriously. This point, however, is missing in 
James Whitman’s analysis. Whitman emphasizes a continental European 
commitment to mercy and individualization as factors working against harsh 
criminal justice.83 However, more important are strong convictions among 
German jurists that severe sentences (such as some sentence ranges in the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines) are grossly disproportionate to the harm caused by the 
prohibited conduct. This is not a matter of individualization, but of the 
appropriate assessment of wrongdoing. If a group of German judges were 
presented with a case such as United States v. Blarek,84 they most likely would all 
agree that this sentence was shockingly disproportionate. 
My comparison of teaching in American law schools with teaching in 
German law departments (which is admittedly based on only superficial 
knowledge of the former) has led me to suspect that the professional self-
understanding of those who teach at law schools might impact future lawyers—
and thus future judges. Law school courses can be developed from either an 
internal or external perspective. The internal perspective is a normative 
perspective: it is focused foremost on the interpretation of positive law, but not 
exclusively. It is also focused on finding the appropriate, just solution for a legal 
conflict. In contrast, the external perspective takes an outsider’s look at the law 
and applies the perspective of sociology, cultural theory, history, literature, or 
economics. The external perspective is often not interested in the positive law 
or court decisions, but rather focuses on the cultural, political, or economic 
 
 83.  WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 1.  
 84.  See United States v. Blarek, 7 F. Supp. 2d 192 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (despite no prior record, the 
defendant received a prison sentence of eleven to fourteen years for money laundering). 
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roots and relations of the law. Or in some cases it is focused on deconstructing 
court decisions, rather than on developing solutions. My impression is that the 
external view of the law is more popular in American law schools. One could, of 
course, argue that the external approach is more intellectually stimulating (and 
one should not propose that it ought to be neglected altogether). But the 
internal perspective, combined with a strong commitment to the value of 
proportionality, has its advantages, too. Here we might find a second paradox, a 
second irony: well-meaning modern agendas promote an attitude of critical 
distance—but this detached, external view might be less than ideal for the 
education of judges-to-be compared with an affirmative stance towards legal 
values such as justice and proportionality. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Hopefully, two points have been made. First, legal systems can work fairly 
well and achieve moderate, non-disparate sentencing patterns, even if the 
legislature does not strive to curtail judges’ discretion through sentencing 
guidelines. Second, details deserve attention beyond broad pictures of the 
historical, socio-economic, and cultural frameworks. Circumstances which might 
help keep sentencing levels down and avoid arbitrariness are: the existence of a 
“last resort” measure to cope with extremely dangerous violent offenders, 
politically neutral and meritocratic recruitment of judges, a liberal self-concept 
of the judiciary dominating the corporate identity, and a legal education system 
that affirms legal values such as proportionality rather than focusing on external 
views of the law. The approach was explanatory, not normative. I do not claim 
that the German legal system is perfect when it comes to sentencing law and 
sentencing theory—it certainly is not—but desirable revisions to German 
sentencing law were not the topic here. Nor do I wish for these tentative 
explanations to be confused with simple policy prescriptions. Obviously, 
remodeling another judiciary around a corporatist, civil-servant model would 
not be an easy task. And, more importantly, sentencing outcomes are also a 
product of contingencies. While the corporatist model seems to work well 
within the Zeitgeist of contemporary Germany, this does not mean that a 
benevolent impact is to be expected at all times. The same holds for the 
bifurcation between measures of incapacitation and criminal punishment, which 
in Germany seems to relieve the criminal punishment sector of some pressure. 
But introducing a measure of preventive detention might not have this effect in 
all legal systems. Concerning the need to strengthen the normative commitment 
to proportionality in legal education, one might conclude that this could be 
desirable regardless of the socio-political-cultural context. But, admittedly, it is 
hard to estimate the impact of legal education compared to the many other 
factors that determine judges’ sentencing decisions. 
